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I. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the proper interplay between faith and law is 
challenging, if not vexing.  Errors are committed on two extremes—
on the one hand, mandating principles of faith by law, while on the 
other hand, excluding principles of faith from the public square.  As I 
argued in a recent article,
1
 theistic legal realism properly encapsulates 
the core principles that should govern the interplay between faith 
and law.  Expanding on my previous work, this Article critiques two 
important modern legal theories, legal realism and John Rawls’s con-
cept of public reason, from the perspective of a theistic legal realist.  
Part II summarizes theistic legal realism.  Part III briefly describes 
how American law devolved from theism to relativism.  Part IV ex-
plains that although legal realism properly disavowed the hyper-
deductivism in early American law, legal realism erred by not provid-
ing a proper normative basis for just law.  Part V similarly explains 
how Rawls’s concept of public reason was a mixed attempt to balance 
law and faith.  Rawls understood that law should be based on prin-
ciples accessible by all and should not impose precepts unique to one 
faith.  Rawls’s concept of public reason nevertheless excludes proper 
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religiously based principles from the public square and is rooted in 
relativism that undermines effective base legal norms. 
II. THEISTIC LEGAL REALISM 
Theistic legal realism is related to theistic moral realism.  Moral 
realism is a philosophical belief in objective moral values common to 
humanity.
2
  There are foundational principles of right and wrong for, 
and knowable by, all rational creatures.
3
  Theistic moral realism re-
cognizes the Creator as the source of common objective values and 
includes the belief that the pattern of the Creator’s purpose is re-
vealed in creation and written on the heart of mankind.  It is based 
on two presuppositions.  First, and foundationally, God is good, and 
He desires to bless humanity and all of His creation.
4
  Second, God 
has designed us to live in harmony with inherently good, objective 
moral values embedded in our nature.
5
  We prosper when we act in 
accordance with these values and experience troubles when we vi-
olate them.
6
 
We access God’s inherently good objective values by the exercise 
of right reason, including following our God-given conscience.  This 
process involves the proper exercise of the natural reason God gave 
man—not just thinking, but discerning correctly.  Natural reason is 
part of our created nature that bears the image of God.  We are not 
born with a cognitive knowledge of objective values but rather with 
the innate ability to discern those values.  As God designed it, the ex-
ercise of right reason leads to the discernment of objective truth; truth 
is not the mere fruit of human reason.
7
 
Common objective moral principles (general revelation), rather 
than principles attainable only by faith or a particular religious belief 
(special revelation), provide the foundation for theistic moral realism.
8
  
Regarding the substance of the basic objective principles of moral 
truth, “the first precept of law [is] that good is to be done and pur-
sued, and evil is to be avoided.”
9
  Specific basic principles of moral 
 
 2 RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENSE 2 (2003). 
 3 Id. at 17. 
 4 Hernandez, supra note 1, at 704. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 704–05. 
 9 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, ques. 94, art. 2, at 1009 (Fathers of 
the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (n.d.). 
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truth, which can be found across cultures and time, “include honesty in 
relationships, family loyalty, personal dignity, concern for others, tem-
perance, justice, and the respect for, and preservation of, life.”
10
  An 
important clarification is in order here.  The fact that these core prin-
ciples are timeless and universal—that they can be found across cul-
tures and time—does not mean that they are numerous or widely and 
consistently applied.  The point is not that all cultures across time have 
many principles in common, but rather that core precepts of theistic 
moral realism are reflected in consensus that exists across cultures and time. 
The related concept of theistic legal realism provides the proper ba-
sis for discerning legal norms.  “Theistic” reflects the Creator who is 
the ultimate source of binding norms; “legal” suggests the focus on 
civil or human law; “realism” indicates reality, fidelity to human na-
ture, and an accurate assessment of things as they are.
11
  By combin-
ing these concepts, theistic legal realism reflects the true nature of legal 
norms.
12
  It includes two core principles. 
First, civil rulers must base law solely on principles of general re-
velation, not principles unique to any faith.
13
  The church and state 
have separate jurisdictions under which the state may not rule the 
conscience.  Principles of special revelation, which can only be ac-
cepted by faith, are not the proper basis for the substance of civil 
law.
14
  Basing law solely only on principles accessible to all—principles 
of general revelation—ensures a fair and just legal system.
15
  Only 
principles of general revelation can fairly govern everyone, including 
people of any or no faith. 
 
 10 Hernandez, supra note 1, at 705 (citing Charles E. Rice, Natural Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 310 
(Edward D. McLean ed., 2000) (quoting Harvey N. Chinn, Protestant Cheers Pope’s Mes-
sage, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 15, 1994, at 10 (praising Pope John Paul II’s encyclical 
Veritatis Splendor))).  As I explain in Theistic Legal Realism, C.S. Lewis’s THE ABOLITION 
OF MAN (1947) provides an excellent summary of the base norms of general revela-
tion that can be found across cultures and time.  Lewis identifies the following prin-
ciples or laws, which, although not comprehensive, summarize timeless, universal, objec-
tive truths: the Law of General Beneficence, the Law of Special Beneficence, Duties to 
Parents, Elders and Ancestors, Duties to Children and Posterity, Law of Justice, the Law 
of Good Faith and Veracity, the Law of Mercy, and the Law of Magnanimity.  These 
laws reflect core principles of theistic moral realism.  Hernandez, supra note 1, at 705–
06. 
 11 Hernandez, supra note 1, at 706. 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 706–08. 
 15 Id. at 708. 
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Second, civil rulers must vigorously protect and preserve reli-
gious liberty and expression.
16
  The law must not impose unique prin-
ciples of faith, Christian or otherwise, which would intrude on indi-
vidual conscience and overstep the government's limited, God-given 
authority.
17
  Preserving religious liberty also serves the common 
good.
18
  Believers should not advocate preserving religious liberty 
solely to vindicate their faith.  Preserving religious liberty protects the 
conscience rights of all, including people of no faith.
19
 
A critical distinction must be drawn between the proper activities 
of a governmental ruler and those of a private citizen or theorist.  The 
civil ruler who is formulating law may use faith-based sources, including 
Scripture, but only to apply principles of general revelation.  Believers 
 
 16 Id. at 706, 708. 
 17 Hernandez, supra note 1, at 708. 
 18 Id. at 709; see also Pope Benedict XVI, Address at the General Assembly of the 
United Nations (Apr. 18, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.catholic.net/ 
index.php?option=dedestaca&id=305). 
     Discernment . . . shows that entrusting exclusively to individual 
States, with their laws and institutions, the final responsibility to meet 
the aspirations of persons, communities and entire peoples, can some-
times have consequences that exclude the possibility of a social order 
respectful of the dignity and rights of the person.  On the other hand, 
a vision of life firmly anchored in the religious dimension can help to 
achieve this, since recognition of the transcendent value of every man 
and woman favours conversion of heart, which then leads to a com-
mitment to resist violence, terrorism and war, and to promote justice 
and peace.  This also provides the proper context for the inter-
religious dialogue that . . . . should be recognized as the means by 
which the various components of society can articulate their point of 
view and build consensus around the truth concerning particular val-
ues or goals.  It pertains to the nature of religions, freely practised, that 
they can autonomously conduct a dialogue of thought and life.  If at 
this level, too, the religious sphere is kept separate from political ac-
tion, then great benefits ensue for individuals and communities. . . .   
     Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious free-
dom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once indi-
vidual and communitarian—a vision that brings out the unity of the 
person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citi-
zen and that of the believer. 
Id. 
 19 Hernandez, supra note 1, at 709; see also Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 18 
(“Refusal to recognize the contribution to society that is rooted in the religious di-
mension and in the quest for the Absolute—by its nature, expressing communion 
between persons—would effectively privilege an individualistic approach, and would 
fragment the unity of the person.”).  For Christians, preservation of religious liberty 
also allows the Gospel to be proclaimed fully and freely.  See Hernandez, supra note 1, 
at 709. 
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may access all revelation when speaking or acting as private citizens, ra-
ther than as civil rulers, including when espousing legal or governmen-
tal theory or, most importantly, when ministering to others.
20
  By not 
imposing unique principles of faith in law, believers can still fruitfully 
analyze issues of law and government while respecting the jurisdictional 
boundaries of church and state.
21
 
III. FROM THEISM TO RELATIVISM 
American law was rooted in the core principles of theistic legal 
realism.  The common law, the Declaration of Independence, and 
the Constitution reflected theistic belief.  The Founders were influ-
enced by natural law thinking, principally the theories of John Locke, 
who grounded his Second Treatise of Civil Government firmly in theism: 
[A]ll men are naturally in . . . a state of perfect freedom . . . within 
the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depend-
ing on the will of any other man. 
 [C]reatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to 
all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same facul-
ties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordi-
nation or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all, 
should by any manifest declaration of his will set one above 
another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment 
an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. 
 . . . . 
 [T]he law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legisla-
tors as well as others.  The rules that they make for other men’s 
actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be 
conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which 
that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the 
preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or va-
lid against it.
22
 
Lockean natural law theory influenced state constitutions and, 
most notably, the Declaration of Independence, which was overtly 
theistic: 
 When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for 
one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected 
them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, 
the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of 
 
 20 See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 716. 
 21 Id. 
 22 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: THE SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT 116, 184 (Mark Goldie ed., Everyman 1993) (1689). 
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Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind requires that they should declare the causes which im-
pel them to the separation. 
 We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain un-
alienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness.
23
 
Although not explicitly theistic, the U.S. Constitution reflected 
the core principles of theistic legal realism by ensuring religious li-
berty for all while prohibiting the establishment of religion
24
 and the 
imposition of religious tests for public office.
25
  The absence of overt 
theism in the Constitution did not reflect the intent to create a secu-
lar government.  The Founders established a limited federal govern-
ment in a Republic of preexisting state governments, not a compre-
hensive national governmental system.
26
  At the time the Constitution 
was drafted, state law and governmental systems were well established 
and explicitly theistic—some state laws even transgressed the proper 
boundaries of church and state by imposing Christian belief.
27
  The 
common law—which, as Blackstone’s Commentaries made clear, was 
rooted in theism
28
—served as the foundation for the states’ laws.  
Thus, except for the laws that imposed uniquely Christian principles, 
American law in the Founding era reflected the core values of theistic 
legal realism. 
The slow fade of American law from theism to relativism in the 
nineteenth century was rooted in earlier disagreements over the 
proper source and substance of law.  Under classical natural law 
 
 23 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1–2 (U.S. 1776). 
 24 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25 Id. art. VI. 
 26 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 224 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987) (“[T]he danger which most threatens our political welfare is that the State 
governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union.”).  By narrowly interpret-
ing the Necessary and Proper Clause, Hamilton argues that the power of the federal 
government is limited and enumerated, in contrast with the broader power of the 
state governments.  Id. 
 27 Michael V. Hernandez, A Flawed Foundation: Christianity’s Loss of Preeminent In-
fluence on American Law, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 628, 655–56 (2004). 
 28 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38–41 (“[W]hen the supreme Being 
formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, He impressed certain prin-
ciples upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would 
cease to be.”).  
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theory,
29
 exemplified by Thomas Aquinas’s refinement of Greek and 
Roman legal thought, the development of human law involves all 
forms of human reason (inductive, deductive, and analogical) to dis-
cern God’s design for human governance.
30
  In the seventeenth cen-
tury, two prominent English theists who influenced the development 
of the common law, Francis Bacon and Edward Coke, disagreed over 
the proper use of reason for law.  Bacon advocated treating law as a 
natural science, repudiated traditional authority and Aristotelian de-
ductivism, and embraced inductivism.
31
  By contrast, Coke cham-
pioned Aristotelian deductivism combined with English custom, ad-
vocating what became known as “historical jurisprudence.”
32
  
Ambivalent toward natural law and inductive reasoning, Blackstone 
instead embraced historical jurisprudence.
33
 
Given the influence of the Commentaries on American common 
law, it was not surprising that early American law followed the lead of 
Coke and Blackstone, not Bacon.  Although historical jurisprudence 
was not universally accepted by the Founders, it eventually produced 
the deductive formalism seen in early nineteenth century American 
common law.
34
  Natural legal scientists advocated legal reform 
through the use of natural law and inductive and analogical reason-
ing to complement the deductive application of legal norms.
35
  Re-
grettably, natural legal science never achieved preeminence.
36
 
 
 29 Some commentators have referred to this as the Scholastic Natural Law.  See, 
e.g., Francis E. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contribu-
tions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 (1942).  I avoid the use 
of this label because of the negative connotations attached to it by legal realists, such 
as Jerome Frank.  See infra notes 69–73, 81–87 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Hernandez, supra note 27, at 663–64. 
 31 Id. at 665 (citing Howard Schweber, The Science of Legal Science: The Model of the 
Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 
421, 442 (1999)).  As Bacon wrote, “Formations of notions and axioms by means of 
true induction is certainly an appropriate way to banish idols and get rid of them.”  
FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 48 (Lisa Jardine & Michael Silverthorne eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1620).  
 32 Id. at 665–66 (citing Howard Schweber, The Science of Legal Science: The Model of 
the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 
421, 442 (1999)). 
 33 Id. at 667 (citing GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW 34 n.75 
(1986) (discussing Blackstone’s ambivalence toward natural law)). 
 34 Id. at 668.  One commentator decried this “Pseudo-Natural Law of 19th Cen-
tury American Jurisprudence . . . which decapitated the sound philosophy of the 
founding fathers.”  Lucey, supra note 29, at 493. 
 35 See Hernandez, supra note 27, at 668–69. 
 36 Id. at 669. 
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Instead, Christopher Columbus Langdell’s inductive scientific 
approach to legal reasoning became the predominant methodology 
of legal reform.
37
  Langdell rejected “natural law, Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries, common law deductivism, and [a] moral foundation [for] 
law.”
38
  Like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and John Chipman Gray, 
Langdell espoused the Darwinian view that law is an evolving human 
convention, solely an instrument to serve social demands.
39
 
Several schools of thought competed with Langdell’s inductiv-
ism.
40
  Arguably none rivaled legal realism, which was perhaps the 
most controversial and influential legal philosophy of the early twen-
tieth century. 
IV. LEGAL REALISM 
A. Father Realist Holmes 
Although Holmes was technically not a realist because his scho-
larly work mostly predated the movement,
41
 legal realists frequently 
cited Holmes, lauding him as the father of their philosophy.
42
 
Holmes’s experiences in the Civil War influenced his embrace of 
secular relativism.  As a Harvard student, Holmes revealed openness 
to theistic belief and higher moral values.
43
  Two months before his 
graduation, Holmes joined the Union forces, and he was wounded 
three times during the War, once nearly fatally.
44
  Confronting his 
mortality while lying on a hospital bed, Holmes became convinced 
 
 37 See id. at 669–70 (citing William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement 
upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 565 
(1974)). 
 38 Id. at 670 (citations omitted). 
 39 See id. at 652–53.  Langdell asserted in the introduction to his contracts case-
book that each legal principle “has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in oth-
er words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries.”  C.C.  LANGDELL, 
A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi (Legal Classics Library 1983) 
(1871). 
 40 See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1924) (analyzing philosophical, his-
torical, and analytical jurisprudence). 
 41 JEFFREY A. BRAUCH, A HIGHER LAW: READINGS ON THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN 
THOUGHT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 140 (2d ed. 2008). 
 42 See Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1037–38 
(1961). 
 43 Hernandez, supra note 27, at 706 (citing ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT 
VALUES 41–42 (2000)). 
 44 Id. at 707 (citing ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES 106 (2000)). 
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that he, not a higher power, was his ultimate source of strength.
45
  
Given his experiences in the horrific war that divided and almost de-
stroyed America, it was hardly surprising that Holmes came to em-
brace force as the remedy for conflict.
46
  Holmes also believed expe-
rience is the essence of law.
47
  Advocating jurisprudence devoid of 
eternal values,
48
  Holmes “sounded the principle theme of twentieth-
century jurisprudence when he wrote that moral preferences are 
‘more or less arbitrary. . . .  Do you like sugar in your coffee or don’t 
you . . . ?  So as to truth.’”
49
 
Like Langdell, Holmes rejected deductive formalism and a fixed, 
moral foundation of law.
50
  But Holmes opposed Langdell’s view that 
law is a closed inductive science.
51
  Holmes’s famous assertion that 
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic, but experience” not only re-
 
 45 Id. 
[W]hen I thought I was dying the reflection that the majority vote of 
the civilized world declared that with my opinions I was en route for 
Hell came up with painful distinctness—Perhaps the first impulse was 
tremulous—but then I said—by Jove, I die like a soldier anyhow—I was 
shot in the breast doing my duty up to the hub—afraid? No, I am 
proud—then I thought I couldn’t be guilty of a deathbed recanta-
tion—father and I had talked of that and were agreed that it generally 
meant nothing but a cowardly giving way to fear—Besides, thought I, 
can I recant if I want to, has the approach of death changed my beliefs 
much? & at this I answered—No— . . . . 
Id. (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS 
AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 27–28 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946)). 
 46 Id. at 707. 
 47 Id. at 707–08 (citations omitted).  As Professor Albert Alschuler observed, 
     With the smell of war in his nostrils, Holmes concluded that every 
cause—the abolition of human slavery included—was a personal taste 
of no notable significance.  The postwar Holmes ranked the prewar 
Holmes with the Trotskyites, the pacifists, and the Christian Scientists.  
He evidently thought himself a fool to have believed in a cause beyond 
himself.  Experiencing the death of comrades, the flow of senseless or-
ders, the sight of lifeless bodies piled deep in the trenches, the rush of 
blood from his mouth, a bullet in the neck, a bullet in the chest, and a 
bullet in the ankle, Holmes concluded that right could never be more 
than the will of the strongest . . . . 
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES 185 (2000).   
 48 Hernandez, supra note 27, at 708 (citing ALSCHULER, supra note 47, at 41, 184–
86). 
 49 ALSCHULER, supra note 47, at 1 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to 
Lady Pollock (Sept. 6, 1902), in 1 THE HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 
105 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1961)). 
 50 See Hernandez, supra note 27, at 670. 
 51 Id. (citations omitted). 
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flected his belief that society’s norms and preferences determine the 
substance of law, but it was also a repudiation of Langdell’s scholar-
ship on the law of contracts, which Holmes considered overly forma-
listic.
52
  More importantly for the development of legal realism, and 
perhaps reflecting an implicit confession, Holmes argued that legal 
decisions were grounded in the judge’s experiences, preferences, and 
personal values in the context of prevailing norms. 
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even 
the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had 
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the 
rules by which men should be governed. . . . The substance of the 
law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with 
what is then understood to be convenient . . . .
53
 
Holmes correctly challenged both Langdell’s virtually exclusive 
reliance on inductive reasoning and the rigid deductive formalism of 
early nineteenth-century law.  His insistence that law must work in 
context to reach a proper result—and that experience matters
54
—
accurately reflects the dynamic and synergistic process necessary to 
maintain a just legal system.  By believing that law is subjective, prag-
matic, and evolving, however, Holmes embraced relativism and re-
jected the influence of morals on law.  His views were the foundation 
for emerging legal realist thought. 
B. The Rise and Fall of Legal Realism 
Legal realism arose in American jurisprudence in the aftermath 
of the First World War and during the zenith (the Roaring ‘20s) and 
nadir (the Great Depression) of American capitalism.  Although real-
ism was also prevalent in Europe, American legal realism was unique 
in its principal focus on judge-made law.
55
  It arose at a time of, and 
 
 52 Id. at 670–71. 
 53 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (ABA Publishing 2009) 
(1881). 
 54 Holmes’s belief that experience is the foundation of law ironically echoes nat-
ural law theory, although excised from its moral foundations.  Hernandez, supra note 
27, at 671. 
 55 GARY J. AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE CHANGING CONSENSUS 100 (1990) (“Focusing on the personality 
of the individual judge, realism urged good men to give their nation good laws, and 
to accept once and for all the responsibility which attends the presumption of judge-
made law.”).  European legal realism did not principally influence judge-made Amer-
ican law because much of Europe uses a civil-law system in which judicial precedent 
is less influential.  JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A PRIMER 
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arguably due to, the increased influence of the judiciary reflected by 
a rapid acceleration in printed case reports in the late nineteenth 
century.
56
  The central controversy surrounding legal realism came to 
the fore in a heated exchange in the Harvard Law Review between 
Dean Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn in 1931. 
Pound had contributed to the effort to reform the increasingly 
formalistic common law.
57
  His sociological jurisprudence involved a 
modern pragmatism that believed law must be effective to achieve 
just results in current contexts: 
[T]here are many approaches to juristic truth and . . . each is sig-
nificant with respect to particular problems of the legal order; 
hence [we must value] these approaches, not absolutely or with 
reference to some one assumed necessary psychological or philo-
sophical basis of jurisprudence, but with reference to how far they 
aid law maker, or judge, or jurist in making law and the science of 
law effective, the one toward the maintaining, furthering, and 
transmitting of civilization, the other toward organizing the mate-
rials and laying out the course of the legal order.
58
 
Pound, however, became alarmed by what he considered to be the 
excesses of the legal realist reformers.  He took the realists to task in 
his article, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,
59
  which described a 
number of flaws in legal realist thought, some of which will be ad-
dressed below.
60
  The most authoritative explanation of legal realism 
can be found in a rebuttal to Pound’s article offered by Llewellyn,
61
 
perhaps the most renowned legal realist. 
Llewellyn began with a pithy encapsulation of the rise and be-
liefs of realism: 
 Ferment is abroad in the law.  The sphere of interest widens; 
men become interested again in the life that swirls around things 
legal.  Before rules, were facts; in the beginning was not a Word, 
but a Doing.  Behind decisions stand judges; judges are men; as 
men they have human backgrounds.  Beyond rules, again, lie ef-
 
ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 36 (1995), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ 
lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf.  
 56 Gilmore, supra note 42, at 1041.  
 57 See AICHELE, supra note 55, at 30–32. 
 58 Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 711 
(1931). 
 59 See generally id. at 697. 
 60 See infra Part IV.C. 
 61 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
HERNANDEZ (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2010  6:35 PM 
916 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:905 
 
fects: beyond decisions stand people whom rules and decisions di-
rectly or indirectly touch.
62
 
In other words, (1) legal realism was a revolutionary force that was 
reinvigorating dead law; (2) facts lead to rules, rather than rules as-
sessing facts; (3) judges’ subjective views determine how those facts 
are adjudicated; and (4) outcomes matter—law must be “real” and 
take into account its impact on the people it affects.
63
  Llewellyn con-
curred with Pound’s belief that realism means 
fidelity to nature, accurate recording of things as they are, as con-
trasted with things as they are imagined to be, or wished to be.  
Insistent . . . on beginning with an objectively scientific gathering 
of facts.  Psychological exposure of the role of reason in human 
behavior, of the extent to which so-called reasons come after ac-
tion as explanations instead of before action as determining fac-
tors, has made a profound impression upon the rising generation 
of jurists.  Looking at precepts and doctrines and institutions with 
reference to how they work or fail to work, and why.  There is a 
distinct advance in their frank recognition of the alogical or non-
rational element in judicial action which the legal science [phi-
losophy?] of the nineteenth century sought to ignore.
64
 
Llewellyn then developed a detailed list of points of disagreement 
with Pound, purporting to establish his views by an objective assess-
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Another principle that permeates Llewellyn’s introduction is hostility toward 
Christianity and higher law thinking.  “[I]n the beginning was not a Word, but a 
Doing” was a transparent and blasphemous play on John 1:1.  John’s Gospel begins 
with this declaration of Jesus’s divinity, creative preeminence, and oneness with the 
Father: 
     In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God.  He was in the beginning with God.  All things 
came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into 
being that has come into being.  In Him was life, and the life was the 
Light of men.  The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did 
not comprehend it. 
John 1:1–5 (New American Standard).  Llewellyn’s insensitivity, if not outright hostili-
ty, to orthodox Christianity was also revealed in his later remark about how legal real-
ism was creating “a touch of frenzy among the locust-eaters”—i.e., the formalists 
committed to stare decisis.  Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 1238.  In a footnote, Llewellyn 
explained that he borrowed the phrase “locust-eater” from Matthew 3:1, 2, 4.  Id. at 
n.37.  This scriptural passage describes how John the Baptist ushered in Jesus’ minis-
try and makes a passing reference to the fact that John ate locusts and wild honey.  
See Matthew 3:1–4.  Llewellyn had to know that Christians would not appreciate the 
life story of a revered historical biblical figure being used as a basis for an epithet. 
 64 Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 1224 (internal citations and quotation marks omit-
ted). 
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ment of the scholarly literature.
65
  Most importantly, Llewellyn pro-
vided a detailed summary of “real realism,” which he described as: 
(1)  The conception of law in flux . . . and of judicial creation of 
law. 
(2)  The conception of law as a means to social ends and not as an 
end in itself; so that any part needs constantly to be examined for 
its purpose, and for its effect . . . . 
(3)  The conception of society in flux . . . so that the probability is 
always given that any portion of law needs reexamination to de-
termine how far it fits the society it purports to serve. 
(4)  The temporary divorce of Is and Ought for the purposes of 
study [with the initial focus being on what the law is, only later 
turning to what it should be.] 
(5)  Distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they 
purport to describe what either courts or people are actually 
doing. . . . 
(6)  . . . [D]istrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-
formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court 
decisions. . . . 
(7)  The belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal 
situations into narrower categories than has been the practice in 
the past. . . . 
(8)  An insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms of its 
effects . . . . 
(9)  Insistence on sustained and programmatic attack on the prob-
lems of law along any of [the above] lines.
66
 
Another, and perhaps the most radical, legal realist, Jerome 
Frank, attacked the “myth” of rule certainty based on his belief in law 
as a father-substitute,
67
 noting that “[c]hildish dread of uncertainty 
and unwillingness to face legal realities produce a basic legal myth 
that law is completely settled and defined.”
68
  Frank believed that 
“confronted by the law, men tend to be baffled by feelings stimulated 
by the father-substitute which law represents, and therefore use nar-
cotizing and paralyzing words to pursue what are relatively childish 
aims.”
69
  Frank used several dismissive and derisive labels for higher 
law, including “legal absolutism,” “Platonism,” “legal fundamental-
 
 65 Id. at 1224–33. 
 66 Id. at 1236–38. 
 67 Frank borrowed this theory from child psychologist Jean Piaget.  Julius Paul, 
Jerome Frank’s Attack on the “Myth” of Legal Certainty, 36 NEB. L. REV. 547, 548 (1957). 
 68 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 45 (Transaction Publishers 2009) 
(1930). 
 69 Id. at 98–99. 
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ism,” “Bealism” (after former Harvard law Professor Joseph H. 
Beale),
70
 and “scholasticism.”
71
 
The influence of Holmes on Llewellyn, Frank, and other legal 
realists was readily apparent.  Applying modern psychological theory, 
the legal realists believed that judges routinely engage in rationaliza-
tion—justifying the desired result after the fact rather than truly and 
consistently following preexisting rules.  Legal realists rejected deduc-
tive formalism.  They were concerned about the impact of the law on 
the parties and society at large and that the law would truly “work.”  
Legal realists also saw the law as an evolutionary process not tethered 
to transcendent norms. 
There were, however, several unique aspects of legal realist 
thought.  First, legal realists insisted on the temporary divorce of the 
“is” from the “ought”—reflecting a heavy emphasis on fact and a de-
sire to force judges to come to terms with their biases and preconcep-
tions.
72
  Second, legal realism involved a more systematic approach to 
grouping cases in narrow categories based on factual distinctions.
73
  
Third, legal realists expressed great faith in science, especially psy-
chology, to assess the motivations for judicial action and to establish 
legal principles to resolve disputes.
74
  Finally, legal realists were com-
mitted to an intentional, systematic, and programmatic attack on ex-
isting legal theories.
75
 
C. A Theistic Legal Realist Critique of Legal Realism 
Legal realism is undeniably true in many respects.  Some rules are 
arbitrary.  Law does involve more than logic.  Judges do allow personal 
preferences and prejudices to affect their decisions.  Beliefs, ideology, 
and other factors have influenced legal decisions.  Not all results can be 
deduced logically and easily.  Science should impact law, because true 
science is of right reason, the foundation of just law.  A consistent appli-
cation of the temporary is/ought divide—considering the facts of the 
case and existing law before assessing how the controversy ought to be 
resolved—would help expose and minimize judicial bias.  Perhaps most 
importantly, law must be assessed in light of its effects on litigants and 
 
 70 Paul, supra note 67, at 550. 
 71 Id. at 548. 
 72 See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 1236–37. 
 73 See id. at 1237. 
 74 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 68, at 98–99. 
 75 See Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 1237–38. 
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society, and a rule that is no longer efficacious should be revised or re-
pealed.  The theistic legal realist would readily agree with all of these 
propositions. 
Yet, skepticism and relativism undermined legal realism.  As 
Pound charged, legal realists were much more skilled at criticism than 
constructive analysis.
76
  As young revolutionaries, the legal realists were 
too inclined to throw out the baby with the bathwater.  Not all judges 
base decisions solely on their personal biases and preferences.
77
  
Healthy skepticism is profitable, but pervasive distrust of judicial mo-
tives undermines the rule of law and the efficacy of the legal process.  
Most importantly, given their belief that judges base rules on subjective 
preferences, legal realism offered no effective guide for how to deter-
mine the “ought” after assessing the “is.”  Legal realism was under-
mined by its own relativism. 
In a passionate rebuttal to Pound’s charge that legal realism was a 
school of thought, Llewellyn essentially conceded that the legal realist 
movement offered no coherent “ought” or normative framework for 
law: 
 What, then, are the characteristics of these new fermenters?  
One thing is clear.  There is no school of realists.  There is no li-
kelihood that there will be such a school.  There is no group with 
an official or accepted, or even with an emerging creed.  There is 
no abnegation of independent striking out.  We hope that there 
may never be.  New recruits acquire tools and stimulus, not mas-
ters, nor over-mastering ideas.  Old recruits diverge in interests 
from each other.  They are related . . . only in their negations, in 
their skepticisms, and in their curiosity. 
 There is, however, a movement in thought and work about law.  
The movement, the method of attack, is wider than the number 
of its adherents.  It includes some or much work of many men 
who would scorn ascription to its banner. . . . Their differences in 
point of view, in interest, in emphasis, in field of work, are 
huge. . . . 
 . . . . 
 
 76 See Pound, supra note 58, at 699. 
 77 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605–06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that he would not vote for an anti-sodomy statute, which he called “sil-
ly,” and yet affirming the right of the Texas legislature to enact the law); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (describing a Con-
necticut anti-contraception statute as "uncommonly silly" but finding no constitu-
tional hindrance to its implementation). 
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 . . . The trends are centered in no man, in no coherent group.  
There is no leader.  Spokesmen are self-appointed.  They speak 
not for the whole but for the work each is himself concerned 
with—at times with little or no thought of the whole, at times with 
the exaggeration of controversy or innovation.. . . 
 . . . . 
 When the matter of program in the normative aspect is raised, the 
answer is: there is none.  A likeness of method in approaching 
Ought-questions is apparent.  If there be, beyond that, general 
lines of fairly wide agreement, they are hardly specific enough to 
mean anything on any given issue. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . When writers of realistic inclination are writing in general, 
they are bound to stress the need of more accurate description, of 
Is and not of Ought.  There lies the common ground of their think-
ing; there lies the area of new and puzzling development. . . .  As 
to whether change is called for, on any given point of our law, and 
if so, how much change, and in what direction, there is no 
agreement.  Why should there be?  A group philosophy or pro-
gram, a group credo of social welfare, these realists have not.  They 
are not a group.
78
 
Llewellyn’s argument reveals legal realism’s ultimate flaw.  Law is 
normative by nature.  A just system cannot be based on pure subjective 
preference.  Legal realism contributed significantly and positively to le-
gal reform by exposing unprincipled jurisprudence and opening law to 
constructive influences from scientific sources.  But it offered no solu-
tions for how to reform law in a consistent, principled, and just way.  As 
philosophical realist C.J. Friedrich noted in his review of Llewellyn’s last 
book, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice: 
 The realism of Llewellyn’s jurisprudence would by many histo-
rians of philosophy and ethics be called “naïve” realism. . . . My 
basic hesitation about Llewellyn’s approach to the law and its real-
ity is his failure to appreciate that in the broad sense which mat-
ters to the philosopher of law, the science of the law is primarily 
concerned with norms, that they constitute the focus, the dimen-
sion of reality.  His tendency to dichotomize rules and behavior, 
rights and behavior, precepts and behavior, obscures the fact that 
rules, rights, precepts—norms, in short—constitute a summing 
up of conclusions derived from past behavior, not only as it was 
but also as it ought to have been. . . .  Law is a rule of right reason, 
and right reason is a faculty of human beings, and their actual 
 
 78 Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 1233–34, 1251, 1254–56. 
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behavior is subject to evaluation in terms of such right reason, not 
only outside the law but more particularly inside it.
79
 
Although Pound shared some of the realists’ relativistic and fer-
menting tendencies,
80
 he realized that a viable legal theory required a 
normative framework: 
As the analytical jurist insisted on the pure fact of law [the new 
realist] seeks the pure fact of fact.  But facts occur in a multifa-
rious mass of single instances.  To be made intelligible and useful, 
significant facts have to be selected, and what is significant will be 
determined by some picture or ideal of the science and of the 
subject of which it treats. 
 . . . . 
 Radical neo-realism seems to deny that there are rules or prin-
ciples or conceptions or doctrines at all, because all judicial ac-
tion, or at times much judicial action, cannot be referred to them; 
because there is no definite determination whereby we may be 
absolutely assured that judicial action will proceed on the basis of 
one rather than another of two competing principles; because 
there is a no-man’s land about most conceptions so that concrete 
cases have been known to fall down between them; because much 
takes place in the course of adjudication which does not fit pre-
cisely into the doctrinal plan.  Such a view is not without its use as 
a protest against the assumption that law is nothing but a simple 
aggregate of rules.  But nothing would be more unreal—in the 
sense of at variance with what is significant for a highly specialized 
form of social control through politically organized society—than 
to conceive of the administration of justice, or the legal adjust-
ment of relations, or, for that matter, the working out of devices 
for the more efficient functioning of business in a legally ordered 
society, as a mere aggregate of single determinations.
81
 
Pound therefore called for “[r]ecognition of the significance of 
the individual case, as contrasted with the absolute universalism of the 
last century, without losing sight of the significance of generalizations 
and conceptions as instruments toward the ends of the legal order.”
82
 
Interestingly, the most ardent legal realists eventually conceded, at 
least to some degree, the validity of and necessity for legal norms.  
Frank’s last book contained a chapter assessing the value of natural law 
 
 79 C.J. Friedrich, Karl Llewellyn’s Legal Realism in Retrospect, 74 ETHICS 201, 206 
(1964). 
 80 See supra notes 58, 64 and accompanying text. 
 81 Pound, supra note 58, at 700, 707–08. 
 82 Id. at 710. 
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and the teachings of Thomas Aquinas.
83
  Frank remained highly critical 
of the form of natural law rooted in fatalistic naturalism
84
 and also of 
Social Darwinism, which he believed was a variant of natural law that 
opposed all legislation designed to better the common lot of mankind.
85
  
Nevertheless, Frank at least partially recanted some of his previous at-
tacks on scholasticism.
86
  He praised Roman Catho-
lic/Scholastic/Thomistic Natural Law for recognizing both basic and 
secondary general precepts of universal law and the need for positive 
law principles to vary with time, place, and circumstances.
87
  Frank ac-
knowledged that “no decent non-Catholic can fail to accept the few ba-
sic Natural Law principles or precepts as representing, at the present 
time or for any reasonably foreseeable future, essential parts of the 
foundation of civilization.”
88
 Ultimately, Frank saw natural law as a 
mixed lot: 
 Natural Law yields, at best, a standard of justice and morality for 
critically evaluating the man-made rules, and, perhaps, for ensur-
ing a moderate amount of certainty in those rules; but it furnishes 
no helpful standard for evaluating the fact-determination of trial 
courts in most law-suits, and no assistance in ensuring uniformity, 
certainty, or predictability in such determinations.
89
 
Max Radin, whom Llewellyn identified as a prominent realist,
90
 
more explicitly acknowledged the need for moral norms in law: 
Realist jurists may keep themselves aloof, if they like and if they 
can, from any form of metaphysics or of non-metaphysics.  But 
they cannot be realists unless they are well aware, either as judges 
or critics of judges, that the business of judgment is to decide be-
tween a better and a worse readjustment of the human relations 
disturbed by an event, and that the terms better or worse imply a 
valuation and a standard. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . I have no hesitation in declaring my belief that a realist ex-
amination of existing social and economic facts indicates defects 
in our social structure and that where a judgment will have the re-
sult of enlarging or lessening this defect, it is unrealistic to pre-
 
 83 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 346–73 (2d prtg.1950). 
 84 See id. at 361. 
 85 Id. at 353. 
 86 Paul, supra note 67, at 549 n.5. 
 87 FRANK, supra note 83, at 362–65. 
 88 Id. at 364–65. 
 89 Id. at 367. 
 90 See Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 1226–28 n.18. 
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tend that this is not so, and that it is no business of the judge to 
consider that fact.  That commits us to a particular standard of 
better and worse.  And where no such result is obvious or likely, I 
like to think of realists boldly facing the fact that their final prob-
lem is an ethical one and that good or bad is determined by mor-
al ideals.
91
 
Radin argued, “There is nothing subjective . . . about applying a stan-
dard of conduct which the overwhelming majority . . . would at once 
recognize.”
92
 
Perhaps most surprisingly, in a 1939 article initially published in 
the Notre Dame Lawyer and reprinted in his last book, Jurisprudence: Real-
ism in Theory and Practice, Llewellyn acknowledged that natural law was 
compatible with legal realism.  Llewellyn began by discussing the differ-
ence between the philosopher’s natural law and the lawyer’s natural 
law. 
93
  He then stated that the lawyer’s natural law “affords a concrete 
guide to the making of proper positive law, and a concrete guide for 
the correction of positive law which has gotten itself badly and aberrant-
ly made.”
94
  After noting many commonalities between realists and nat-
ural law adherents, Llewellyn concluded, 
[I]t is difficult for me to conceive of the ultimate legal ideals of 
any of the writers who have been called realists in terms which do 
not resemble amazingly the type and even the content of the 
principles of a philosopher’s Natural Law. 
 . . . [T]his “realist” welcomes the modern Natural Law move-
ment—including those parts of it which he doubtless does not yet 
understand.
95
 
The excesses of realism may have been a function of the time in 
which the theory arose.  The world was undergoing cataclysmic 
change in the 1920s and 1930s.  The first worldwide military conflict 
had just ended.  The American economy had hit unprecedented 
highs and lows, resulting in untold suffering.  In this environment, 
the yearning for change and improvement was understandable.  But 
a jurisprudence that offered neither a blueprint for substantive 
progress nor norms to protect life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
 
 91 Max Radin, Legal Realism, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 824, 825 (1931). 
 92 FRANK, supra note 83, at 368. 
 93 Karl Llewellyn, One “Realist’s” View of Natural Law for Judges, 15 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 3 (1939), reprinted in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 111–12 (1962). 
 94 Id. at 5, reprinted in LLEWELLYN, supra note 93, at 113. 
 95 Id. at 8, reprinted in LLEWELLYN, supra note 93, at 115; see also Friedrich, supra 
note 79, at 202–03 (noting Llewellyn’s surprising endorsement of natural law). 
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ness provided no lasting answers.  A mere decade later, the world 
confronted the atrocity of the Holocaust.  Although legal realism 
could assess and expose the root causes of totalitarianism, the ab-
sence of a framework to assess the “ought” left it powerless to offer 
law and society a basis to guard against future governmental abuses.  
As Radin, Frank, and Llewellyn eventually conceded, common ethical 
base norms are essential for just law.  The lack of a consistent, cohe-
rent basis for those norms was a glaring omission in legal realist 
theory. 
V. RAWLS’S PUBLIC REASON 
When considering a theory to fill the gap left by legal realism, John 
Rawls’s public reason theory is perhaps the most thoughtful, compre-
hensive, and influential contemporary attempt to explain the proper 
source of legal norms.
96
  The primary focus here is on Rawls’s concept 
of public reason as explained in his 1997 article, Public Reason Revisited,
97
 
rather than his political liberalism theory generally. 
Rawls was born in 1921, as the legal realism movement was emerg-
ing.  Although he was not a jurist, Rawls was a moral philosopher who 
wrote extensively about government, justice, and law. 
98
  His seminal 
work, A Theory of Justice,
99
 built on social contract theory to propose “jus-
tice as fairness.”  In his later work, Political Liberalism, Rawls advocated 
the principles of “reasonable pluralism” and “overlapping consensus” to 
address how adherents to differing comprehensive doctrines could par-
ticipate in liberal democracy.
100
  Shortly after the publication of Political 
Liberalism, Rawls gave a lecture on public reason at the University of 
Chicago Law School, which he revised and published in the Chicago 
Law Review.
101
  His final book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement,
102
 which 
he completed shortly before his death, was both a compilation of years 
of lecture notes in the course he taught on political philosophy at Har-
vard and an attempt to clarify and summarize his prior works, including 
 
 96 For a thoughtful discussion of the integration of Rawlsian principles to con-
tract remedies, see C. Scott Pryor, Principled Pluralism and Contract Remedies, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 723, 733–40 (2009). 
 97 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
 98 See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (2000). 
 99 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
 100 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 141 (expanded ed. 2005). 
 101 Rawls, supra note 97. 
 102 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001). 
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his theory of public reason premised on his notion of political liberal-
ism. 
Rawls advocated several principles with which a theistic legal realist 
could agree.  Rawls’s concept of the original position posits the prin-
ciples of justice that would prevail in a society that involved free and 
fair cooperation between citizens.  In the original position, however, 
representatives are placed behind a “veil of ignorance” which keeps 
them from assessing fully the individuating characteristics of their cit-
izens.
103
  These concepts approximate the principle of right reason, 
drawn from general revelation, and the notion that the imperfection 
of man clouds that reason.  Similar to the distinction between special 
and general revelation, Rawls differentiated transcendent values, such 
as salvation and eternal life, and the reasonable political values, based 
on an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, that must 
govern society.
104
  Political liberalism views all comprehensive doctrines, 
both religious and secular, as belonging to first philosophy and moral 
doctrine and thus outside the more limited political domain.
105
  This 
principle approximates the requirement of theistic legal realism that 
law must not be based on principles of special revelation, accessible on-
ly by faith. 
By contrast, 
[L]iberal political principles and values, although intrinsically 
moral values, are specified by liberal political conceptions of jus-
tice and fall under the category of the political.  These political 
conceptions have three features: 
First, their principles apply to basic political and social 
institutions (the basic structure of society); 
Second, they can be presented independently from 
comprehensive doctrines of any kind (although they 
may, of course, be supported by a reasonable overlap-
ping consensus of such doctrines); and 
Finally, they can be worked out from fundamental 
ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a 
constitutional regime. . . .
106
 
The concept of liberal political principles and values approximates the 
notion that law must be based only on generally accessible principles 
(general revelation). 
 
 103 See RAWLS, supra note 100, at 22–28. 
 104 See Rawls, supra note 97, at 780. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 776. 
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Similarly, under Rawls’s concept of the proviso, 
[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, 
may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, pro-
vided that in due course proper political reasons—and not rea-
sons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that 
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines 
introduced are said to support.
107
 
The proviso presupposes reasonableness, which Rawls refines in the 
principle of reciprocity: 
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and 
equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are 
prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation accord-
ing to what they consider the most reasonable conception of po-
litical justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at 
the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided 
that other citizens also accept those terms.
108
 
Public reason also includes a commitment to pluralism and liberty of 
religion and conscience: 
[P]ublic reason is a political idea and belongs to the category of 
the political.  Its content is given by the family of (liberal) political 
conceptions of justice satisfying the criterion of reciprocity.  It 
does not trespass upon religious beliefs and injunctions insofar as 
these are consistent with essential constitutional liberties, includ-
ing the freedom of religion and the liberty of conscience.  There 
is, or need be, no war between religion and democracy.  In this 
respect political liberalism is sharply different from and rejects 
Enlightenment Liberalism, which historically attacked orthodox 
Christianity.
109
 
Theistic legal realists would find significant agreement with each of the 
above concepts. 
Rawls’s public reason theory nevertheless errs in two critical re-
spects.  First, Rawls was too inclined to believe that the arguments ac-
ceptable to a majority in a pluralistic constitutional democracy are rea-
sonable.  Rawls began The Idea of Public Reason Revisited by noting that 
his concept of public reason “belongs to a conception of a well ordered 
constitutional democratic society.”
110
  Although he noted that a hall-
 
 107 Id. at 783–84. 
 108 Id. at 770. 
 109 Id. at 803–04. 
 110 Rawls, supra note 97, at 765. 
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mark of constitutional democracy is reasonable pluralism
111
—a value 
theistic legal realism shares—Rawls embraced majoritarian relativism, 
not timeless, universal principles of truth: 
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and 
equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are 
prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according 
to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political jus-
tice . . . . 
 [W]hen, on a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, 
all appropriate governmental officials act from and follow public 
reason, and when all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideal-
ly as if they were legislators following public reason, the legal 
enactment expressing the opinion of the majority is legitimate law. . . . 
 . . . . 
 A citizen engages in public reason . . . when he or she delibe-
rates within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most 
reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses 
political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also reason-
ably be expected reasonably to endorse. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [W]hen hotly disputed questions . . . arise which may lead to 
a stand-off between different political conceptions, citizens must 
vote on the question according to their complete ordering of political 
values. . . . [T]he outcome of the vote . . . is to be seen as legiti-
mate provided all government officials, supported by other rea-
sonable citizens, of a reasonably just constitutional regime sin-
cerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason. This 
doesn’t mean the outcome is true or correct, but that it is reasona-
ble and legitimate law, binding on citizens by the majority principle.
112
 
Rawls thus presupposed that “reasonable” arguments acceptable to 
a majority in a pluralistic constitutional democracy are legitimate, even 
if not “true” or “correct.”  History has shown otherwise.  A democratic 
majority pools both collective knowledge and collective ignorance.  Our 
Founders established a representative republic and included a Bill of 
Rights in our Constitution that became a beacon of light to the world,
113
 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 770, 773, 798 (emphasis added).  Here, Rawls echoes Holmes’s statement 
that “truth was the majority vote of that nation that could lick all others.”  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918). 
 113 See, e.g., Soli J. Sorabjee, Equality in the United States and India, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
ABROAD 94, 96 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (discussing the influ-
ence of the Bill of Rights on the framing of India’s Constitution). 
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precisely because of a healthy mistrust of the passions of the majority.
114
  
Of course, no form of government perfectly protects from error.  Our 
Founders and early leaders wrongly embraced race-based slavery and 
denied blacks and native tribes—most notably the Cherokee Nation—
life, liberty, and property without due process of law, all via a represent-
ative, political process.
115
  The will of the majority can be inherently un-
just or misguided, particularly in an era of cultural relativism, and must 
be curbed when it is. 
Second, Rawls’s treatment of such divisive contemporary political 
issues as marriage, women’s rights, and abortion reflected anti-
traditionalism and a cramped view of the proper role of religious pers-
pectives in the law.  On each of these issues, Rawls unjustifiably asserted 
that appeals to traditional or historical mores constituted improper im-
position of comprehensive doctrines. 
Concerning marriage, Rawls argued: 
[I]n a democratic regime the government’s legitimate interest is 
that public law and policy should support and regulate, in an or-
dered way, the institutions needed to reproduce political society 
over time. These . . .include the family (in a form that is just), ar-
rangements for rearing and educating children, and institutions 
of public health generally . . . .  [T]he government would appear 
to have no interest in the particular form of family life, or of rela-
tions among the sexes, except insofar as that form or those rela-
tions in some way affect the orderly reproduction of society over 
time.  Thus, appeals to monogamy as such, or against same-sex 
marriages, as within the government’s legitimate interest in the 
family, would reflect religious or comprehensive moral doctrines.  
Accordingly, that interest would appear improperly specified.
116
 
Rawls’s equating of arguments against polygamy or same-sex marriage 
with comprehensive doctrines is unexplained and indefensible.  A theis-
tic legal realist would consider the nature of marriage across cultures 
and time, including an assessment of whether and how various forms of 
marriage supported a just society, to determine the propriety of poly-
gamy and same-sex marriage.  Based on right reason, this assessment 
would be accessible to all people and would not require the imposition 
of faith.  Marriage is an institution inherent in the created order, not a 
 
 114 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(“If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be in-
secure.”). 
 115 Hernandez, supra note 27, at 645–52. 
 116 Rawls, supra note 97, at 779. 
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civil construct to be defined by a contemporary democratic majority.  
Rawls labeled these general revelatory arguments “religious” and 
wrongly argued that they should be precluded from public debate, the-
reby requiring people of faith to check their general revelatory prin-
ciples at the door to the public square. 
Regarding women’s rights, Rawls reasonably argued that the 
“equal rights of women and the basic rights of their children as future 
citizens are inalienable,” but then recommended that the law “protect 
them wherever they are.”
117
  In other words, “the spheres of the political 
and the public, of the nonpublic and the private, fall out from the con-
tent and application of the conception of justice and its principles” so 
that the law—again, presumably the will of the majority—may regulate 
private husband/wife relations.
118
  Rawls believed this is necessary to 
remedy “[a] long and historic injustice to women” from having to bear 
an unjust share of the task of raising, nurturing, and caring for 
their children. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . If a basic, if not the main, cause of women’s inequality is 
their greater share in the bearing, nurturing, and caring for 
children in the traditional division of labor within the family, 
steps need to be taken either to equalize their share, or to com-
pensate them for it.
119
 
The theistic legal realist would agree that the law must recognize the 
equal rights and dignity of men and women.  Law should neither favor 
nor disfavor men or women based solely on gender.  Rawls’s rejection 
of the traditional roles of men and women nevertheless reflected his re-
lativism and hostility toward timeless universal truths, including the fact 
that men and women are biologically different in ways that necessarily 
affect parenting roles.  On the most fundamental level, his suggestion 
that women have a greater share in bearing their children is both un-
deniably true and nonsense.  It is a biological necessity that women bear 
children, and a significant reason women spend more time nurturing 
children is because women have breasts.  One could reverse Rawls’s 
point by arguing that men should be compensated because they have 
been denied the equal privilege of bonding with their children, both 
before and after birth, and, as a consequence, have borne the greater 
burden in providing financially for their families.  The futility, and inan-
ity, of this debate, and of Rawls’s implicit quarrel with the Creator, 
 
 117 Id. at 791. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 790, 792–93. 
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should be apparent.  Rawls offered no evidence to validate his assertion 
that it is in the public interest for law to divide spouses and regulate 
their private choices.  The law of equal rights is just so long as the law 
does not force men and women to assume specified roles in the family 
and is consistent with timeless universal principles regarding the hus-
band/wife relationship. 
Rawls’s political bias is perhaps most glaring regarding abortion.  
Rawls concluded that arguments on both sides of the issue could be of 
public reason, thus the matter should be decided by the will of the ma-
jority properly expressed through the political process.
120
  In so doing, 
he lectured people of faith, particularly Roman Catholics, that they 
must accept that all pro-abortion arguments are of public reason and 
thus assent if the majority wants to preserve the right to an abortion: 
 Some may, of course, reject a legitimate decision, as Roman 
Catholics may reject a decision to grant a right to an abortion.  
They may present an argument in public reason for denying it 
and fail to win a majority.  But they need not themselves exercise 
the right to abortion.  They can recognize the right as belonging 
to legitimate law enacted in accordance with legitimate political 
institutions and public reason, and therefore not resist it with 
force.  Forceful resistance is unreasonable: it would mean at-
tempting to impose by force their own comprehensive doctrine 
that a majority of other citizens who follow public reason, not un-
reasonably, do not accept.
121
 
Because he only offered abortion as an illustration rather than to ana-
lyze the substantive issues fully, Rawls did not elaborate on what he 
meant by “force.”
122
  If he meant violent resistance, such as shooting ab-
ortionists, then his point should be uncontroversial.  His expressed 
aversion to people of faith imposing their comprehensive doctrine on 
the majority suggests, however, that he meant by force of law—that is, 
working to make abortion illegal, notwithstanding the presumed (but 
not proven) desire of the majority to the contrary.  Moreover, Rawls as-
sumed the arguments in favor of and against abortion are equally of 
public reason.  Women (and men) surely have the right to liberty and, 
at least to some degree, to bodily integrity.
123
  Abortion, however, impli-
cates much more.  Theistic legal realism would require that the law be 
 
 120 See id. at 798–99. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See Rawls, supra note 97, at 798–99. 
 123 An absolute right to bodily integrity, which would reflect radical libertarianism, 
has of course not been universally accepted across cultures and time. 
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based not just on the will of the majority, but on timeless, universal 
principles regarding the right to life and liberty, the mother/child rela-
tionship before and after birth, the marital relationship as it pertains to 
childbearing, and, to the extent it is properly understood to exist, the 
woman’s right to bodily integrity.  The legal hierarchy of life, liberty, 
and pursuit of happiness would be at the core of this assessment.  Life is 
the foundational right because the other rights are meaningless without 
it.
124
  One does not have to be a faithful Catholic—or a person of faith at 
all—to understand or apply these principles. 
Rawls’s public reason falls short of its promise.  The relativism in-
herent in Rawls’s public reason does not provide an adequate norma-
tive basis for the substance of law, and Rawls’s public reason theory 
wrongly excludes generally accessible, reasonable principles from the 
public square. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legal realism and Rawlsian public reason significantly influenced 
modern American law, for the better in some notable respects.  The le-
gal realists properly insisted that judges should clearly articulate the 
true reasons for their decisions and that law must be effectual to be just.  
Law must be grounded in reality, assessed in part based on its impact on 
the parties at issue and society at large.  Rawls admirably attempted to 
protect religious liberty while elaborating on the necessary distinction 
between norms appropriate for law and those left to individual con-
science.  Legal realists and Rawls nevertheless fell short because they 
failed to appreciate the need for timeless, universal base norms as the 
foundation of law. 
In his debate with Llewellyn, Pound asserted that “we [have not] 
observed the phenomena of legal institutions among all peoples with 
sufficient accuracy and objectivity to be in a position to formulate any 
 
 124 See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Christifideles Laici: On The Vocation and the Mis-
sion of the Lay Faithful in the Church and in the World ¶ 38 (Dec. 30, 1988) (tran-
script available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_30121988_christifideles-laici_en.html). 
     The inviolability of the person which is a reflection of the absolute 
inviolability of God, finds its primary and fundamental expression in 
the inviolability of human life.  Above all, the common outcry, which is 
justly made on behalf of human rights—for example, the right to 
health, to home, to work, to family, to culture—is false and illusory if 
the right to life, the most basic and fundamental right and the condition 
for all other personal rights, is not defended with maximum determi-
nation. 
Id.  
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laws of legal development therefrom.”
125
  Pound’s assertion may have 
been true eighty years ago, but it is no longer so.  As theistic legal real-
ism affirms, a detailed historical study of human experience and prac-
tice across cultures and time, using the resources of anthropology, soci-
ology, psychology, and yes, theology (to assess general revelatory 
principles), is necessary to identify proper base legal norms.  Contrary 
to Llewellyn’s scolionophobia,
126
 I look forward to seeing a thriving 
school of theistic legal realists dedicated to that task. 
 
 
 125 Pound, supra note 58, at 698–99. 
 126 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (insisting that there was no "school" 
of legal realists). 
